2014 Report: Main Challenge Space

Post created July 6, 2014
last edits February 12, 2015

July 20 Note: The report is now available and discussion could start anytime - but no rush. Have a read first.
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Here I start my call to challenge the CIWCL's new report I just authored:

The Battle For The Houla Massacre: The Video Evidence Explained (and the rest reconsidered)

(PDF direct download/view link - 60 pages but digestible and with lots of
pictures and extras - download page with short summary here).

This post will gather links to specific arguments/challenge points, suggested by myself or readers, and gather the best challenges and note any corrections thus forced. I anticipate correcting a few things myself, but hope that others will join in.

Especially helpful would be anyone from the millions of people pre-conditioned to discredit the report's findings, but patient enough to actually show why one should, rather than just presuming it. It's a sacrifice to get specific and run the risk of being specifically wrong. I ask people to now take that risk, as we are with this report and other research.

July 12: Challenge Approach
I'm open on just how to approach this, but this is my first thought:
1) Readers who read the report and think they have a serious challenge - or even a question - can first do so here, in a comment.
2) If it turns out interesting enough, that and the related discussion could then be copied or even moved (you can run out of space here!) to a new post where it's related, with space below for further discussion on that narrower subject.
3) Each of these would be given a link in this post and brief notes as warranted. Any corrections we consider sufficiently justified will be made, noted, and become their own parts of the investigation thereafter.
4) If you're not sure you have a point but think you might ... it's a question. Go research to find out, or ask me. Ex: "this part ... sounds like it can't be right. What is that based on? You cite "x" but I don't get how..."
5) A better idea on approach would be a better idea. So bring that too if you have one.

July 20 Ground Rules: 
I hope to get people from different perspectives commenting and debating here, and over an emotive topic (and maybe off onto related emotive topics) So ... let's keep it on or close to topic. Attack the argument, not the arguer. Swearing is fine, but let's be respectful to each other, try to find even small agreements when possible, and stay constructive.

Serious, engaged efforts are preferred, obviously, to the kind of self-amused drive-by "duh-bunking" I've encountered so often when engaging with mainstream "skeptics," mindless defenders of the status quo (some call them "government plants," but I think "corporate media vegetables" captures the essence better).

December 12, Broad Response Invitation: Six months in ... to help get things moving, you can mention
- a typo or suspected error you spot
- statements of agreement or disagreement (specific)
- suggestions (NOT soliciting new source material unless it's a video and you've checked it against all those cited and know it's new - let's not clog the comments with reposts and guesses - I doubt it will be an issue)
- questions (like how we decided on a point), etc.

The best comments will directly discuss videos we cited and the content of them.

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Special Challenge Spaces
* Eliot Higgins: Brown Moses on the Hook
If anyone else feels inspired to really review in detail and would like extra space, well there's plenty here now but that will change. I'm open to giving you your own post with fresh slate like Mr. Higgins gets (probably without the snarky set-up). First request should be made in at least one initial comment below.
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Collected Updates:
C1 July 21: because I already know it's needed, a space to review Abdulrazaq-Abbara-Clocktower Connection? re: page 34 in the report.
C2 Dec. 12: (minor)page 41, left-hand graphic: the orange arrow should point to the smaller building just south of the one indicated.
Otherwise, none yet as of December 23 (just started really trying about a week ago).
C3 Feb. 12 2015: I challenged my revised time zone decision. It was right to reflect DST, but that was on top of a wrong time zone, an old error that got set in stone. I thought Syria was in UTC+3 with Iraq, but it's in UTC+2 with Lebanon. I'm embarrassed that underpins most of my/our Syria research. All times given, from sunset across, back down an hour, with minor effects on narrative lineup.

Victims: Other = Abdulrazaq

December 29, 2014
last edits January 9, 2015

One of the more interesting findings we (CIWCL-ACLOS) can add to the record of the Houla Massacre came late in the investigation, inspired by patterns traced beneath the May 2, 2013 al-Bayda massacre. A year after Houla, a crime of similar size and even greater barbarity hit a small Sunni village near coastal Baniyas, and was followed the next day with another hideous and more murky massacre in Baniyas itself.

One seemingly minor fact was the single victim Sheikh Omar al-Biassi, a retired Imam who was a known government loyalist and critic of the rebellion. Rebel sources acknowledged this to some degree, but managed to make it seem irrelevant. However ... our research on opposition victim records showed only about 70 reliably-listed victims, to the claims of nearly 170. Of the 69 currently listed at the VDC (it was once 70) 23 are named Biassi (diff. spellings), Fattouh, or Fattouh-Biassi. A further 37 have three other names of families that can be shown to be intermarried with the targeted Biassis. That's 60 victims, out of the cited death tolls of 62, 70, and less reliably 165 and 169. That is, virtually the entire verified part of the massacre is of people with illustrated, apparent relationship - by blood or marriage - to the government-loyalist retired imam.
* http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Talk:Al-Bayda_Massacre#The_Imam_and_his_Family
* http://ciwclibya.org/syria/specificcommunites.html
* http://www.globalresearch.ca/media-disinformation-and-coverup-of-atrocities-committed-by-us-sponsored-syria-rebels/5350325

In Houla too there was some reason the two main family groups were singled out. Allegedly, the Sunni Al-Sayed families were picked for being government supporters (related to the new secretary of Syria's parliament, careers in the police and military, non-defected), and the Abdulrazaqs for failing to support the rebels, plus according to some, converting to Shi'ism. The opposition is short on reasons, just pointing out that the victims all were just as Sunni as anyone, mildly anti-government to neutral or passively pro-government and no threat to anyone. Mainly they were just Sunni people, in a Sunni town, massacred by Alawites from just down the road and that had a clear enough story arc.

And perhaps because the alleged indiscriminate distance shelling is important to show the government and its artillery were involved, there was always extra emphasis put on the few victims who appear to have died randomly from that.

The original reading has the listed victims in 4 groups with massacred Abdulrazaq families (app. 60-62 names) being the largest, and the Al-Sayeds category roughly tied with Other/unclear civilian, at about 15-20 each, with the rebel fighters (about 4-6) last, and defending soldiers not even mentioned, of course.

An original list at ACLOS of "other" ignored a few possible rebels to note possible massacre victim family names: Kurdi, Abbara, Al-Sweiee/Alsoiei, Ismael, Harmoush, Zegahi/Zikahi. Scattered clues eventually brought together suggest all of these names - as well as Moussa, Bakour, Hussein, and Arouq - are of families intermarried with the alleged convert Abdulrazaq clan. Some were married right into and died in those homes, some apparently were targeted elsewhere over the relation. It may be there was nothing random about any of the death toll, aside from the actual battle casualties. As explained below, these - when read this way - expand the Abdulrazaq portion of the massacre by 22-23 victims, for about 80 total of the now-best-reading death toll of 110 civilian victims.

Sources: Full citations not ready at the moment. An early rundown by FSA "activist" Akrama Bakour (a very possible perpetrator in the massacre) traced out some of these connections in his early account to the BBC (see here) The rest come from correlating different opposition lists and records, especially the "2014 list" no longer available at its original spot on Facebook. The names as listed by family, compiled in this PDF. The photos it once came with, we'll see...

A generally coherent picture emerges, with some patches of greater mystery and some links tying in clusters of victims being fairly solid. Names that seemingly connect and how:

* Kurdi, Arouq, Hussein +9-10 victims, listed as executed: Akrama Bakour said that Shabiha first "entered the neighbourhood," meaning Saad Street, "and met a shepherd at the entrance. His name is Mahmoud al-Kurdi, and he was with his daughter-in-law and his four grandsons. They shot them, killing them all except the daughter-in-law. She was shot in the thigh and belly area but she is still alive. They then entered the house of Samir Abdul Razaq," which he then clarifies was intimately related to the Kurdis. Besides those named Abdulrazaq, Samir lost "his daughter-in-law Halloum El Khlaf, six months pregnant, with her son Ala'a Abdul Razaq, and Samir's sister-in-law Khaloud El Khalaf, and her daughter, Rahaf Al Hussein - but her daughter Zahra Al Hussein was shot twice but survived."
Khlaf, in all other sources, comes out Kurdi: VDC and the rest list Haloum Hussein al-Kurdi (baby son Alaa is named Abdulrazaq in the lists, so not "other"), Rahaf Hussein, and Khloud/Khalida al-Kurdi.
"Samir's wife was hit with the back of the rifles but she fainted and is now still alive," Bakour continued, ending the Kardi segment with. "Also among the victims in this house were four kids whose father is Fadi al-Kurdi." The best reading is that Fadi al-Kurdi's kids are the same as Mahmoud's "four grandsons" (Omar, Mohammed, Mahmoud, and Mustafa Fadi al-Kurdi), and just mentioned here twice. Otherwise, the second set of four Kurdi kids is missing from everyone else's lists. That's 8 "other" name victims.
Missing from this tally is Mustafa's wife, Zainab Arouq (retained "maiden name") widely listed as a victim, and, according to the 2014 list, listing a Fadi Mahmoud family (his dad should be named Mahmoud) with only two boys, and a 9-year-old girl also named Zainab, and shown in a photo. This may be one of the missing boys re-branded, rightly or not, or another victim not listed before (with two brothers missing here) That's 9-10 names.

* Al-Sweiee +4 boys, executed. These boys aged about 9-11 were always listed, noted by the VDC as having a mother named something like Amama, not listed as a victim. But the 2014 list includes her, as Omamah Abed al-Rahman Abed Al-razaq, 32 years old, married to Bassam Khaled Al-Sweeai (absent, survived) and mother of the four listed boys (Jaber, Hazem, Hatem Bassam al-Sweiee (or Alsoiei) and a Bassam or Bassam Jaber al-Sweiee. That's 4 related "others" and a previously-unlisted Abdulrazaq victim, at least per that source.

* Ismael +2 two women executed: Both of these are clearly married-in women who retained "maiden names." Haloum Ismael, 52 years old, married to Abdelrahman Khaled Abdulrazaq, two adult children Salma and Mahmoud listed as killed with them. Safeera Mouhamed Ismael, 27 years old, married to a Feras Abdelrahhman Abdulrazaq (the above's son?). Two boys age 5 and 9, Hamza and Abdelrahman, werebkilled with extra brutality per the photos with the 2014 list original posting - skull sliced open, jaw torn off. Safira is rare for adult female victims in being shown, with a bloodied face.

* Harmoush +2 One executed, one shelled: Two adult females named Fadia Harmoush, but with different middle names, have long been listed as Houla Massacre victims. One is given in the 2014 list as Fadia Abed Al-Hakeem Harfoush 35, wife of one Ouqba Meysar Harmoush, her maiden name missing. Killed in unexplained shelling. Location unknown. Only the name makes it likely she's related to Fadia Ashraf Harmoush, 25 years old, married to Shaalan Abdelkhalek Abdulrazaq but with the usual maiden name, with 4 kids aged 3-8 killed.

* Zegahi/Zikahi/Moussa +2: The "rebel defector" mentioned two members of this family killed in rebel shelling that seemed accidental even to him. One fighter, firing on the military intelligence HQ on Main Street with a "bazooka," missed and hit the house "next door, killing two members of the family Al-Zegahi, which, as it is said, just have been sitting down and peacefully drunk tea." VDC lists only one who might be killed here, a young man Raed Ishaq Al-Zikahi, but listed as field executed. The other: a wife in an Abdulrazaq home. Previously just Badriah Qadour Moussa, unclear execution victim, age 36 with 5 kids. The 2014 list has Bedreih Abed Al-Kader Al-zukahi, 45 years old mother of the Feisal Shafq Abed Al-razaq, with five children aged 10-14 (as given) and killed with extra brutality. So does Moussa someow translate to Zegahi? Raed's case supports that: one list had a victim Raed Ishaak Moussa dying in his place...

* Bakour +1: Raghda Saed Bakour is listed as the wife of surviving Ayman Abdulrazaq, and mother of five massacred children aged 18 months to 17 years, at least two with skulls sliced open.  

* Abbara +2-?: VDC and most full lists of 108 or so victims include both Ammar Abduljawad Abbara and Mohammed Shafiq Abarra age 27 - both killed by shelling . FSA fghter Akrima Bakour told the BBC one Mohammad Abbara along with "his daughter Amina and her family of seven" were "killed in the massacre" as well as a Mohammed Shafiq Abbara There is an Amina Shafiq Abdulrazaq listed, married with kids named Abdulrazaq. This suggests she married an Abdulrazaq man and, unusually, had that appear as her name rather than the usual here (see above). Was her maiden name Abbara embarrassing? No Mohammed Abbara old enough to have daughter with kids is listed by anyone else. The VDC gives both the Shafiq-named people (Safira and Mohammed) as married with 5 children ... if it were the same five, that would be a family of 7 total. But the 2014 list with family breakdowns says he was married to no victims, and she was married to a Mohammed Refiq Abdulrazaq, not deceased, and only one daughter died with her (Bayan Mohammed Abdulrazaq).
  In short, a lot almost lines up here but remains confused. Any link to the Abbaras remains speculative, but supporting it we have Bakour's listing that excludes the Al-Sayeds, and so seems to focus on the Abdulrazaqs and their relations exclusively. The surrounding name suggestions, and otherwise unexplained "family of 7" all further suggest that was a pretty good guess.
  The Abbara clan would seem wealthy land-owners: the rebel defector mentioned in passing "the house on the northern corner of the square belongs to the family Abbara." In fact,  Wikimapia labels (not 100% reliable) suggest they own most of the land around the center of Taldou aside from the mosque. These show a Daoud Abbara owns the seven buildings around the clocktower post's northwest corner referred to by the defector. Further, they say his grandfather owns the open land and some homes to the southwest of the clocktower, and other Abbaras own buildings just west of these. (see here) As for those killed, which he did not specify as including any Abbaras: "The families were wealthy, but the bandits assumed them as traitors, because these families have never supported the armed rebels through donations."

Furthermore...
VDC list, all shelling and shooting victims, civilian: 7 total, missing a few others. Yousef (shelling) and Bakour (shooting) are likely rebel fighters after all. The other 5 are listed as dying just from "shelling," which should be fairly random. - Mohammad Shafiq Abbara Shelling Ammar Abduljawad Abbara -Yakoub Hussein Abdulrazaq - Fadia Abdul Hameed Harmosh - Fatima Ahmad Abdulaal "She was martyred during displacing because of the shelling" Only Fatima escapes a clear implied link; four of those five random deaths are seemingly related to the Abdulrazaqs - one of them apparently is an Abdulrazaq.



Yacoub, and that actor guy from the strange videos - note how
they don't put any one name on here. 

One post of the 2014 Houla Massacre Facebook page mentions the Saad Street RPG Incident we've studied, and the four seemingly dead men on the street there. This source names all four, intriguingly; Yacoub Hussein Abdulrazaq and both Abbara men, along with Riad Ishaak al-Zegahi. Riad is the one with blasted legs (best fit for a shelling victim, listed as executed). The one who seems to be alive and playing dead is in Yacoub's place: there are photos labeled as him showing the living faker - with his apparent blood-pouch thing still unopened - and other views showing a different guy who appears dead, also labeled as Yacoub - see inset) The other two are given there as the Abbaras (Mohammed being the head-blasted guy, Ammar the chubby intact one - not as middle-aged as I thought, once seen close up).

  The rebel defector said "The second family, who was killed by the bandits, lived in the northwest. Even there, the family Abdul Rasak has a house, and this family has become a victim of the bandits." Perhaps that's Yacoub, and he's from north of this point. Mr. Zegahi may be from Main Street by the intel HQ, and the Abbaras are likely from around the overrun clocktower post. This group may be all the scattered/northern adult male relations of the Abdulrazaqs, mostly listed as random shelling victims. As they appear, they were killed elsewhere and dumped here at the head of the road down which the remainder were being killed. Then they were scooped-up and driven south to be formally integrated into the gathered victims and displayed that way.

So... 22-23 "other" entries that may not be "other," in a civilian death toll of 110 or a bit lower (some of those, like Omamah and young Zainab, were never on those lists). Variously, 57-62 Abdulrazaq names already appear, so we have a total of 79-85 Abdulrazaq-related victims, a clear and overwhelming majority. That plus the 15 known al-Sayed relatives is just about everyone, and only two female victims (Fatima Abdulaal and Dalal Abbas) remain clearly civilian and not clearly linked to one of the target families.

So much for "random shelling," and for random targeting of any and all Sunnis. As with the later Al-Bayda Massacre we started with, the body-scooping rebels claim they just found the victims that way, killed by Shabiha-types, for no other reason than being random folks in a Sunni Muslim town. But beneath that bland brush-off, the details in both cases show a very targeted focus on certain families within these towns. And these are the ones with clear or alleged pro-government sympathies and/or a religious inclination the Sunni extremist rebellion disapproves of. The rebels offer no good reason why Shabiha single out these particular families over and over, and just hope that the world keeps blithely ignoring this recurrent pattern of brutality and deceit.

Abbara Victim Photo Mysteries (Graphic)

January 12, 2015

Yet another newly-identified clue come from the fascinating, and now-unavailable 2014 Houla Massacre Facebook page. There's one victim they didn't include in their list of 105 victims, but set aside in his own post for "Gheiyath Abed Samad Suliman - 28 year old. The first martyr at Houla massacre - Died during tank bombing at the Town 25-5-2012" This featured two photos, one with a man looking intact, if hit in the head with a rifle butt, perhaps, and the second one showing a man with a head largely crushed.

The clear conclusion one is led to is that Mr. Suleiman's head was somehow smashed apart after he was dead and in opposition hands. However, a cursory look at the photos shows these are two different men with different faces and hair, different skin tone, facial hair density, etc.

Which one is Suleiman and who is the other man? Well, the first face doesn't look familiar from anyone else. Neither does the second one, really. But that gray-brown blanket with green trim does look familiar. I only just now noticed this and made the connection. It's clearly the same type, if not the same one, seen here:

A photo released at the time of the massacre, matching one of the 4 "Saad St." victims, not included at the 2014 Facebook page, but clearly of the victim they name as Mohammed Shafiq Abbara (below, stretched from original).

 

He was first seen, I think, on that same blanket as supposed Mr. Suleiman. And upon review, the victim on it in each view seems to have the same type of chin and hair cover, lower lip offset as, and longish hair, as far as can be seen.

What they seem to lack is consistent head damage. As we've seen him so far, Mr. Abbara's face stops at about the eyes. He does not seem to have enough forehead remaining to match.

Is it possible all in that top view is present in all views, just looking better once tucked together? If so, that's it, we just have another view, falsely attributed.  I haven't reviewed the videos yet, but it seems possible ... but also unlikely. I cannot really see the bottom view here unfolding into the top.

If not, what could happen to an already busted-up body to worsen it to this degree? Dragging from the back of truck for bit might do it. Another RPG blast, perhaps. If anything was done, it was after that first photo and before he was seen on the street with no blanket, around 7:15 PM, fully damaged. The other blanket photo is presumably after that scene, since they first found him just killed without it. but ... wouldn't it be interesting if both blanket photos were from before 7:15? Was the first image, apparently taken in the dark with a flash, taken this early, well before sunset? Perhaps, indoors with no electricity (there was none, someone cut it at the time of the rebel offensive). But at the moment, I'm not sure. Anyone else have a thought on this?

And as for the blanket - it's got a lighter border with Arabic writing in it. It's been said some rebel views show saying National (Watani) Hospital, a place rebels never admit they got to. I couldn't make it out, but this is the only blanket I've noticed with any writing. The hospital is well south of the place this guy was seen, further yet from the place he likely lived (near the clocktower), and on the other side of defenses that seem active for some time. So maybe all blanket images are from later on, and the intact face thing is just an illusion.   

The Pharmacist Explained?

January 9, 2015

from http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Al-Houla_Before_and_After_the_Massacre#Medical_Personnel_Killed

Both pro-government and anti-government sources agree a pharmacist was murdered somewhere in al-Houla sometime around the massacre of May 25. An older woman told ANNA News after that event "police positions were attacked. All the soldiers were killed, then they attacked our villages, torched a hospital in Al-Houla. Bandits killed our pharmacist next to the pharmacy for the fact that he has treated a wounded soldier." She makes it sound a bit like that was part of the 25th's violence, but it is set aside, after mentioning the hospital, and amidst talk of numerous attacks: recently "the number of terrorist attacks increased." So it's quite possible she just refers to a recent event.

So, a week earlier, opposition activists posted this video: Homs, houla 17 5 2012 martyr pharmacist Khaled almsfa who aghtalth the hand of treachery (translated). The opposition VDC lists a Khalid Mustafa killed this day in Hula by "shooting." Videos cited: 1 (same) 2 (private, was probably the same) But they say Mustafa is not his real name: the video description adds "martyr pharmacist Khalid al-Barrak البراك known as the ((Khalid Mustafa) which اغتالته Assad's gangs, just because he reach the wounded." Same premise the woman mentioned, but not the same killers. (same video given as "Pharmacist, martyr Khaled Abarrak" per LCC/Uruknet daily report)

It shows a younger or at least fit man, deceased, in rebel hands. The quality is poor and dark, but we can see that his neck has a band of extreme red all around it. It's not cut, just burned raw maybe, as if by friction. That's not shooting; some kind of hanging is implied.

Another posting of the same video suggests identity problems: Houle, Yet another unidentified corpse found on the road murdered by Assad's.17-5-2012 video gone, but another of the same name was posted Aug. 10, but with 17 5 in the title. This is the same 0:39 video, one posting available in here with English subtitles. These say he's unidentified, despite the title in some postings.

Now consider May 2012-05-18, Syrian Crisis Updated by the (not pro-rebel) Syrian Center for Documentation, via Voltairnet archive. The following day, they report as recent news "Armed rebels kill Mustafa Al-Hijjo and hang him on a tree in front of his house in Al-Hwleh area of Homs countryside."

If his house and his pharmacy are the same, this is how the woman described it. She just said killed, not hanged, but the rebel video shows a hanged pharmacist. The name Hijjo seems to be the one sometimes rendered Hajjow = حجو. The VDC shows no one of that name dying at this time; if they listed him at all, it's as Khalid Mustafa. So it seems likely this is all the same man, named Mustafa al-Hajjo, ironically re-named at death Khaled (immortal) Mustafa. Then maybe to clarify Mustafa is not part of his real name, they give his actual real name as Khalid al-Barrak - immortal and blessed.

Why the UN Investigation is Open to Question

Post created July 19, 2014 
(incomplete)
last edits January 6, 2015

The findings of the United Nation Commission of Inquiry into Syria (CoI), carried out under the auspices of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, provides the closest thing the "international community" or has to an official story on the Houla Massacre. Because of its supposed rigor and impartiality, the CoI's findings are the first source turned to by the Western media and leaders to support their decision to blame the government and allied, genocidal, Alawite militias. 

The findings related on this blog differ greatly, and this post is meant to answer the questions many will have on seeing that disagreement. How on Earth could their rigorous, impartial findings, with such a logical conclusion, be trumped by amateur online investigators?  How is their investigation even really open to question at all? 

The Reports:

* Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 

Republic UN Human Rights Council, June 27, 2012. PDF link. 

* United Nations Human Rights Council: Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. August 16, 2012. A/HRC/21/50 PDF link

Some reasons to doubt their findings: (not an exhaustive list):
1) The Commission of Inquiry was chaired by Karen Koning Abuzayd,  a US diplomat and director of a Washington think tank (Middle East Policy Council) that clearly shares the basic outlook and goals of the US government and its corporate backers. Imagine if this were reversed and a pro-Assad Russian think tank director were put in charge of the probe - can you imagine the uproar? But it's reversed and so everyone calls it credible, not because our slant is the good guy one but because its the one so pervasive it's generally invisible. 
  
2) Its findings are based largely on believing, with little scrutiny, the rebel-supplied alleged witnesses while doing whatever they could to ignore the other alleged witnesses. The Western media and governments already relied on this screening method for their narrative. Repeating that exercise does nothing to "confirm" those prior calls in a manner that reflects well on the report's credibility. (see post Witness Reliability.)

3) A number of flawed and shifting decisions regarding the rebel offensive and security situation are highlighted in our 2014 report, pages 38-40, 43-45, 46, 52, and pages 54-57. The net effect, perhaps coincidentally, is to leave them presuming unfettered government control in the massacre zones rebels almost got themselves into. Thus, most likely it was pro-government forces who did the killings, and so on.

4) The CoI seemingly ignored the UN's own previous findings on Houla to leave itself uninformed, and then blamed the Syrian government. Their June report with its lack of clear blame on the regime notes, perhaps in explanation for that, "the CoI was unable to visit the site of the killing as it has yet to be afforded access to the country. This fact substantially hampered the investigation, and its findings should be viewed in that light."
  But they had a report submitted by the UNSMIS monitors with detailed testimony from Houla residents, and apparently failed to look at it, while insisting on new access for the CoI in particular. I say they apparently failed to look because they otherwise must have consciously ignored what it said; the CoI said in its later August report, assessing the field of alleged witnesses, "apart from the two witnesses in the Government report, no other account supported the Government’s version of events.” There are over a dozen around in the public record that do so. And there are the ones their own monitors heard from but we have not, in a report they should have had access to, but give no clue - in the reports, anyway - of knowing about.
  At a press conference with journalists in Damascus on June 15, Major-General Robert Mood, head of UNSMIS (the UN Special Mission in Syria) spoke on the report he submitted to New York after his team's visit to Taldou. "We have interviews, interviewed locals with one story, and we have interviewed locals that has another story," he said, both included in the report. He gave no further details, but we know what the two basic stories are, and one is consistent with the government's. Was neither of these narratives his people heard from "locals" (plural) that same one supported by the video evidence? Or did the CoI just never see the report?
  As for how the UNSMIS weighed the two witness sets, Gen. Mood said on June 15 "the circumstances leading up to el Houla and the detailed circumstances, the facts related to the incident itself, still remains unclear to us." In the same press conference, Mood offered to help with further on-site investigation to settle the matter. The first UNSMIS Houla report was never referenced, and the mission was willfully shut down in July (mandate allowed to expire by decision of western governments) so there could never be a second one. Note: a month before that proper disbandment, the UNSMIS decided (were compelled?) to suspend all field investigations due to security worries - on June 16, the day after that press conference. 
  So ... the UN's on-the-ground investigation heard two stories, both compelling enough that the situation remained unclear to them. When everything else the CoI considered at first left it unclear as well ... they blame Syria, for not letting them do an on-the-ground investigation ... even though that already happened and yielded a result that sounds at least as murky.  

Some Failed Massacre Narratives

December 21, 2014

Our broad study of all sources remains stuck on the issue of who did it, but broadly, there's agreement on most of the when questions. It was around 1-2 PM, just after noon prayers, when the rebel attack or the army shelling began. With one side or another chased off or circumvented, someone moved onto Saad street and started massacring the Abdulrazaq families, the majority of the dead, somewhere between 2:30 and 5:30 PM, wrapping up by 6-7:30 PM. Around 11 PM the army either regained control of the massacre area, or still had control like they always did but just then started the smaller massacres on Main Street. By morning all bodies not at the main street sites were gathered by rebels with free access.

A few outlying sources disagree with this broad general consensus. but two I only stumbled on recently are incredibly out of whack with all else. I'm glad we didn't start with these, as it would have gotten us even more confused at first and even slower to make sense of stuff.

Der Spiegel
Der Spiegel (English) published a report on May 28 by Ulrike Putz  in Beirut, citing "at least 109" dead that contains a whole different narrative, I think, from any we've considered.

During the demonstrations, as had often happened in recent months, army snipers opened fire on the protesters, an eyewitness told SPIEGEL ONLINE. Several people were killed in the salvos and demonstrators dispersed.

As the afternoon progressed, the FSA unit, under the leadership of a commander named Mahmud,* decided to take revenge for the deaths. As night fell, the rebel fighters attacked all regime checkpoints in and around the village. Up to this point, the official government version of events is in accordance with these reports, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad al-Maqdisi saying that on Friday afternoon "from 2 p.m. to 11 p.m." there were attacks from "terrorists" against regime troops stationed there. 

....An eyewitness reported that the FSA unit suffered significant casualties during their offensive before committing a decisive tactical error. Instead of holding their position in the village, Mahmud elected to withdraw his unit, leaving the villagers unprotected.

At roughtly 11:30 p.m., the Syrian military then began its bombardment of the village, firing tank shells and mortars into town. One witness claimed that rockets were used as well. Most of the casualties occurred during the bombardment, the eyewitness says. But the eyewitness, whose account could not be independently verified, says that 26 victims were killed by regime supporters who entered Houla during breaks in the bombardment. Many of the perpetrators, the witness claims, came from the surrounding villages.

* Mahmoud Al-Houli, FSA activist?

So instead: snipers at the protest, a rebel offensive and no massacre during the early massacre span, then shelling and rebel retreat only near midnight, not mid-day. Mass shelling deaths, and a few executions by Shabiha types followed, all late at night. This odd assemblage agreed with government reports up to a point, but clearly cut off short of the core assertion that rebels conducted a massacre, and even claims the opposite, to a point.

A later report was already clarifying the regime blame, and criticizing the FAZ claims of a rebel rampage. On June 19 they ran Christof Reuter's report citing a few witnesses who all saw the Shabiha drive and/or walk up from Fullah, as soon as the Army shelling stopped. Since they walked, they must be from there and probably were Shabiha, and he asks why would rebels kill their own supporters? One alleged witness he believed entirely was Ayman Abdulrazaq (aka Hassan, Abu Firas, killed by some reports). The New Century Foundation contacted Spiegel about these somewhat contradictory reports (see here seemingly overrating the discrepancy). They received a defense of  the later report, but no authority to quote anyone. And of course a couple week later they were publishing Reuter's collaborative project with numerous interviews of rebel-supplied alleged witnesses, laced with its own internal contradictions...

Summary: the May 28 piece is an early report of a late massacre following the rebel rampage they almost acknowledged (and that more closely coincides with the bulk of the killings and which video proves!). It has value in showing what might be an abandoned early effort to provide a comprehensive rebel narrative.

"Rawan": Massacre in the morning, massacre at night
Now consider that alongside another much later report I just caught, described as coming directly from an eyewitness to events of May 28 [sic]. Syria Direct, Oct. 22, 2013:‘Men returned from prayer to find their families killed’ "Rawan" is now a nurse in the Al-Aisha refugee camp. A once-neutral Sunni, she "lived among Alawites in al-Houla," which everyone else agrees was effectively Alawite-free. But then "on May 28, 2012," she was radicalized, when she "witnessed the United Nations-condemned al-Houla massacre, where the Syrian regime and the shabiha are reported to have summarily executed at least 108 people in two separate incidents, mostly women and children." She clarifies:

The perpetrators of the Al-Houla massacre are the residents of Al-Houla. The shabiha [pro-Assad militias] are our neighbors, people who used to eat and drink with us.

As for the "two separate incidents," it's not the Abdulrazaqs in broad daylight and the al-Sayeds after dark. No, in her nameless version, the Sunni women and children victims were all herded together in one area in the morning, raped and then burned alive. Then the men - who had been away praying - not fighting or even protesting - were killed at night, after they "went mad" and launched an afternoon-evening offensive (not rampage) in revenge.

The massacre happened on a Friday, when all the men were in the mosque, praying. The shabiha called the regime and told them that all the men were in the mosque, that the houses were empty of men. They took their orders from the regime and went to people’s homes. There were around 50 of them, or more; I saw them with my own eyes. They were going to houses, killing women and children in the morning. Reports say 100 women and children were killed.  

After they finished, they called the security forces and told them the operation had been completed successfully. All the men returned from prayer to find their families killed. They went mad, and decided to exact revenge. They gathered at the mosque, and the shabiha surrounded them and killed them all. By a miracle, some survived.  

Imagine gathering all the women and children and raping them. They didn’t have enough time to kill them before the men got back from mosque, so they put them in one house, closed the door and burned them alive. A massacre in the morning and a massacre at night.

Hm... one could spend days dissecting the inconsistencies within  this word salad or between it and the vast remainder that seems to be based on some kind of real information. It's had zero effect, it seems. But it goes to show how people just opening their mouths and claiming things does not make their claims true. And what happened on May 25 has always been, to the dumbed-down masses, a matter of what Shabiha-blaming people opened their mouths and claimed.

But hey, look! One more direct eyewitness who's probably right, because she blames Shabiha, and that's consistent with what the other correct witnesses said.

The Weak In Review

Post started July 24, 2014
Last addition June 2, 2018

I've been alerting people on both sides of the mental war about the new report. I was expecting some would be unable to handle hosting that info and simply delete my comments. The first one gets itself published here (below)and creates the space for the rest (above that, newest at top).

Note: Anyone irked at my review of their weakness in deleting me, don't bother commenting here. The problem is you're one show of strength behind, and the only rebuttal I won't delete is one that's on-topic and lodged here.

Weak: Eliot Higgins aka Brown Moses (added Dec. 21)
Here I compare the coverage of the Houla Massacre by Eliot Higgins aka Brown Moses with that of ACLOS-CIWCL and myself. Easily it's shown that his flakiness and calls for "cynicism" were no match for our solving the Houla Massacre case. I figured he'd be inclined to ignore our work, explaining midway:

He's all but sure to refuse the challenge because he knows when you read videos right, it can't be shown wrong, and he knows we have it right. He won't want to look stupid denying the undeniable, can't be caught agreeing with it, and has himself boxed into irrelevant silence. History will have to move on without him then, if he can't break down that cardboard box of his own construction.

But I made sure he was aware and gave him ample time, over a week total, to show the slightest public sign to the contrary. As expected, he did not deliver, and shows no sign of the strength needed to break out of that box. That's weak, if also common.

Ironic older quote, Post, Nov. 2013: "If you want someone to really question your work, just post it on the Internet," he says. "There are plenty of people who'll want to tell you you're an idiot and you're wrong." SOmetimes maybe they want to, but they just can't come out and say it, either because you're not wrong, or maybe because they're just too busy.

But then there's this other more recent comment to Syria Direct - December 17, during the challenge period - that would serve well as a segue into an actual review of the type I was suggesting. However, that's most likely a coincidence.

I think we’re facing a situation in Syria where what we need is to get more people working with open-source information ... we keep seeing videos popping up relating to certain battles, but nobody’s really doing anything with them. They need to be put into context; they need to be examined, to see what’s happening, who’s fighting, just to have a better view of the conflict. But that requires a lot more effort.

Covered: the Battle for the Houla Massacre. Open source video evidence all but proves rebels launched it, won it, and exploited that by conducting the massacre after. Higgins reviewed that work, it seems to me, just enough to know he wished it didn't exist and doesn't want to touch it. Maybe I'm wrong on that, and maybe he'll want to tell me I'm wrong and an idiot, But so far he hasn't been able to vocalize anything much.

Weak: Ammar Abdulhamid, Syrian Revolution Digest 
Comment submitted here July 23:

"satellite photography showing pro-Assad checkpoints all over the place." We have on-the-ground video showing rebels taking over 40% to probably 80% of those on the same afternoon right before the killings started. That trumps what their "witnesses" say. These findings - new report, following on another last year -  can be reviewed and challenged here:   http://taldoutruth.blogspot.com/2014/07/2014-report-main-challenge-space.html In there, I correct Hermann on some points (where the Alawites were massacred), but the evidence came out supporting that version after all. Please don't delete this. 

But of course I left him no choice but to delete it. As he explained:

Any person who relies in any part of his analysis on the so-called "voting record"  provided by the Syrian regime demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the farcical nature of the electoral processes in Syria under the Assad. Your analysis of anything Syrian cannot be trusted. For this reason, I will have to delete your comment. 

And that's how it came to be here, with this rebuttal I'll try to make sure he sees:

Well, if you have to, then that's that, right? At least you had a look, apparently. Appreciated.
Am I wrong to trust the election results? Maybe. You noticed it wasn't my major area of study or focus. That's the kind of thing best brought to the challenge space to explain, because people have been just as knee-jerk sure who did the Houla Massacre and they were wrong. Precedent says politically charged claims against Damascus should be examined, not just accepted.
And even then, as I said there, challenges to side-issue like that are less valued than ones that actually touch the core issue of the video-evidence Battle for the Houla Massacre. Anyone who skips over the video evidence to latch onto a weak excuse to "have to" censor me has shown their intellectual weakness. Even Louis Proyect is unrepentant enough he just deletes me without the posturing.
Good luck with the book, hack weakling. 

I could go on with an expose of this guy's slimy propaganda, absolving Islamist atrocities in a way that's got to be at least partly conscious by now, but I'm in this to save time and keep moving.

Dec. 21 note: I may cover - should have already - his exploitations of the Houla Massacre in favor of his "Assad's sectarian strategy" crap, to highlight what he does while running against the best evidence.

Weak: 
Dr. Maher Barotchi and Bonnie Kipperman: Added June, 2018